Abstract: Governments and donors are investing considerable resources on HIV prevention in order to scale up these services rapidly. Given the current economic climate, providers of HIV prevention services increasingly need to demonstrate that these investments offer good 'value for money'. One of the primary routes to achieve efficiency is to take advantage of economies of scale (a reduction in the average cost of a health service as provision scales-up), yet empirical evidence on economies of scale is scarce. Methodologically, the estimation of economies of scale is hampered by several statistical issues preventing causal inference and thus making the estimation of economies of scale complex. In order to estimate unbiased economies of scale when scaling up HIV prevention services, we apply our analysis to one of the few HIV prevention programmes globally delivered at a large scale: the Indian Avahan initiative. We costed the project in the first four years of its scale-up. We develop a parsimonious empirical model and apply a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and fixed-effects Instrumental Variable (IV) estimators to estimate unbiased economies of scale. We find that the scaleup of Avahan has generated high economies of scale suggesting that cost savings are possible when scaling-up HIV prevention in low and middle income countries. order to scale up these services rapidly. Given the current economic climate, providers 6 of HIV prevention services increasingly need to demonstrate that these investments 7 offer good 'value for money'. One of the primary routes to achieve efficiency is to take 8 advantage of economies of scale (a reduction in the average cost of a health service as 9 provision scales-up), yet empirical evidence on economies of scale is scarce. 
Research highlights:
25  Estimation of economies of scale is hampered by several statistical biases that 26 prevent from estimating unbiased economies of scale.
27
 When using appropriate empirical strategies to correct for these biases, we find 28 that scaling-up HIV prevention interventions generate cost savings in low and 29 middle income countries. economies of scale (Schwartländer et al., 2011 ). Yet, little is known about the existence 41 and strength of these. This paper therefore aims to fill this gap by assessing the extent of mobilisation, advocacy and enabling environment activities varied across the sites and 56 included the formation of self-help groups, various drop-in centre events, skills training, 57 legal literacy workshops, police and stakeholder sensitization, crisis response teams 58 and access to social entitlements. HIV prevention across all four states was guided by a 59 common minimum programme. These included a set of implementation standards for 60 technical and managerial areas, project milestones, a common management framework, 61 and a common set of indicators. Beyond this, there was flexibility to adapt services 62 based on local context.
63
In the 4 study states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra), the 
91
Despite the policy interest in this area, to date there are very few papers examining the 92 determinants of average costs of HIV services in low and middle-income countries.
93
Some recent studies (Marseille et al., 2012; Menzies, Berruti, & Blandford, 2012; Rosen, 94 Long, & Sanne, 2008) present evidence regarding the relationship between HIV 95 treatment and hospital size. On a sample of Zambian hospitals, Marseille et al. (2012) 96 find that when the number of patient-years of ART increases by 1, the average cost 97 decreases by 0.23 per cent. Menzies et al. (2012) from a sample of 54 clinical sites in 98 five African countries find that when patient volume is doubled (from 5,000 to 10,000 99 patients), the average cost decreases by 28%. Other studies examine the relationship 100 between scale-up and cost of HIV prevention (Dandona et al., 2005; Guinness, based, bar-based, brothel-based etc.) varies widely between districts (Ramesh et al., 127 2008). In peri-urban districts most of sex-workers are brothel-based (National AIDS (Schwartländer et al., 2011) . Instead, it is common practise to use estimates from 183 studies conducted at the provider level and apply a constant mark-up. A further 184 important finding is that at the NGO and programme levels, an L-shaped curve was 185 found to be more appropriate than a U-shaped curve in both cases, consistent with an 186 absence of diseconomies of scale.
187
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we outline with an L-shaped curve (Lave & Lave, 1970) . In the case of Avahan, an L-shaped relationship between scale and average cost may also be hypothesised for several 222 reasons.
223
Firstly, during the first year of Avahan, NGOs set their budgets (and staffing levels) on 224 the basis of the number of key population members in the district estimated through 225 mapping and various forms of size estimation (Blanchard et al., 2008; Verma et al., 226 2010). In subsequent years, budgets were set in reference to both the number of high- Therefore, we anticipate that the incentives generated by Avahan's programme and 259 funding design lead to the absence of diseconomies of scale. 
323
Since the distribution of the scale measure is right skewed, the variable was log 324 transformed.
325
Insert Table 3 326
The relationship between average cost, measured by the number of high-risk 327 population reached and scale is represented in Figure 1 . While, NGO average cost 328 represents only a small proportion of total average cost, it is interesting to note that its 329 relationship to scale has the same shape as the total average costs, confirming the 330 absence of diseconomies of scale. 
Empirical Estimation

333
From the above, we hypothesise that the presence of diseconomies of scale cannot be 334 assumed to exist. We began our empirical estimation by testing this assumption by 335 comparing a logarithmic form versus a quadratic functional form. We found that the 336 logarithmic fit explains a larger share of the variance than the quadratic fit. One may want to note that a reasonable reason for such finding comes from the fact that although 338 the squared term is statistically significant at 1%, the minimum of the average NGO cost 339 including and excluding programme costs is 6,995 and 5,595 high-risk persons reached 340 respectively. This corresponds to the last percentile in both NGO average cost 341 distributions as we observe only 4 and 3 NGOs respectively with diseconomies of scale.
342
For this reason, a logarithmic functional form was used. 
391
The use of these methods was mainly motivated by the suspicion of reverse causality on the NGO average cost. In both cases, we would observe that the effect of scale on 400 average cost is biased.
401
Regarding the GMM estimator in (4.4), first it is important to point out that the lagged 402 dependent variable was not statistically significant, justifying the fact that we use the GMM in a non-dynamic panel. The choice of the system GMM estimator is motivated by 404 the fact that it has been found to be more efficient than the first-differenced GMM 405 (Blundell & Bond, 1998 
Results
532
NGO average costs excluding programme costs
533
In column (4.1) of 
545
The causal effect of scale-up on average cost is explored by the use of the system GMM 546 in (4.4) and an IV in (4.5) and (4.6). Overidentification tests are used to test whether average cost is over-estimated in previous models. Once we correct for the reverse 556 causality, scale has no effect on NGO average cost. An increase in scale in 1% reduced 557 the average cost by 0.11% in the GMM system estimate, while IV estimates suggest that 558 there are no economies of scale.
559
When quality proxies are added in the IV estimate, we can see that providing outreach 560 services of a higher quality increases NGO average cost. Then it is important to question 561 whether scale-up has not occurred at the cost of quality. To explore this possibility, the 562 number of STI visits and the number of condoms distributed per person reached were 563 regressed on NGO size. We find that an increase in scale has no effect on the number of 564 distributed per person reached. It is conceivable that when NGOs reach full coverage of 566 their estimated population, and with no incentive to increase beyond this they may 567 decide to maximise future budgets by decreasing the intensity of the services provided.
568
However, this was not found in the data when running the estimates only when PR>EP.
569
This suggests that the incentives given by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have 570 allowed NGOs to maximise quantity and that this did not occur at the cost of quality.
571
Insert Table 4 572
NGO average cost including programme costs
573
When focusing on total NGO average costs presented in Table 5 , we can see that
574
economies of scale are very high. This is due to the fact that national level support cost 575 is primarily characterised as fixed cost. Our results suggest that while in the very short 576 run, an increase in 1% in NGO size would result in a decrease in the average cost of 577 0.88%, this percentage will drop to 0.61% in a long run perspective. It is interesting to 578 note that the GMM estimator used to correct for reverse causality leads to similar result 579 than the panel fixed effects estimator, suggesting that the reverse causality issue is not 580 of importance when programme costs are included. This illustrates the fact that NGOs 581 have little room for manoeuvre in determining their total average cost.
582
Insert Table 5 583
Predicted and actual costs when scaling-up the initiative are presented in Appendix 3. 
Discussion
585
We find that the scale up of HIV prevention in India is associated with high economies of 586 scale using a method that is robust for endogeneity biases; this finding suggests that scaling up HIV prevention services is feasible and is a source of efficiency. Additionally,
588
we find no evidence of diseconomies of scale in our sample of NGOs since only 4 Avahan
589
NGOs out of the 111 included in our analysis have experienced diseconomies of scale.
590
We demonstrate that this finding is implicit to Avahan design and mechanism funding in 591 Avahan since NGOs funding was based on target objectives and there was no incentive 592 to reach more people than what the NGOs got funding for.
593
When we consider only the cost incurred at the NGO level, we find no evidence of Standard errors are in parentheses, ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (1) presents the results considering the very short run. Column (2) is the basic estimation with NGO fixed effects. Column (3) is the same model as in column (2) estimated for the sub-sample of NGOs that have reached a higher number of high-risk populations than the one estimated in the catchment area. Column (4) is the GMM model that uses lagged values of the scale as instruments for scale. Column (5a) is the IV estimation that uses drought as an instrument. First stage equation for this model is presented in column (5b). Column (6) is the same model than in Column (5a) except that it includes the quality of outreach as covariate. First stage equation for this model is presented in column (6b) Standard errors are in parentheses, ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (1) presents the results considering the very short run. Column (2) is the basic estimation with NGO fixed effects. Column (3) is the same model as in column (2) estimated for the sub-sample of NGOs that have reached a higher number of high-risk populations than the one estimated in the catchment area. Column (4) is the GMM model that uses lagged values of the scale as instruments for scale. Column (5a) is the IV estimation that uses drought as an instrument. First stage equation for this model is presented in column (5b). Column (6) is the same model than in Column (5a) except that it includes the quality of outreach as covariate. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
